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Abstract 
Redundancy and diversity have long been used as means to obtain high reliability in 
critical systems. Whilst it is easy to show that, say, a 1-out-of-2 diverse system will 
be more reliable than each of its two individual “trains”, assessing the actual 
reliability of such systems can be difficult because the trains cannot be assumed to 
fail independently. If we cannot claim independence of train failures, the 
computation of system reliability is difficult, because we would need to know the  
probability of failure on demand (pfd) for every possible demand. These are unlikely 
to be known in the case of software. Claims for software often concern its marginal 
pfd, i.e. average across all possible demands. In this paper we consider the case of a 
1-out-of-2 safety protection system in which one train contains software (and 
hardware), and the other train contains only hardware equipment. We show that a 
useful upper (i.e. conservative) bound can be obtained for the system pfd using only 
the unconditional pfd for software together with information about the variation of 
hardware failure probability across demands, which is likely to be known or 
estimatable. The worst-case result is obtained by “allocating” software failure 
probability among demand “classes” so as to maximise system pfd. 
Keywords: Software reliability; redundancy and diversity; probability of failure on 
demand; 1-out-of-2 system; protection system 
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1 Introduction 
 
This paper presents an approach for estimating a conservative probability of failure 
on demand (pfd) that is applicable to a 1-out-of-2 diverse protection system where 
one of the protection trains is hardware-based and the other is computer-based. 
The use of a protection system is an accepted strategy for hazardous industrial 
processes. The protection system independently monitors the industrial process and if 
it detects a departure from the safe operational envelope, it initiates some action that 
overrides the normal control system to place the process in a safe state. 
The departure from the safe operational envelope is known as a demand on the 
protection system. Demands typically arise from different failures within the physical 
process and control systems. For example, in the nuclear industry, the underlying 
physical causes of demands on the protection system are known as postulated 
initiating events (PIE[1]), and the overall plant safety analysis will identify a set of 
PIEs that represent credible plant failures (such as loss of electrical grid connection or 
a rupture in the primary coolant circuit). As part of the design process, maximum 
rates are assigned for each PIE and, to reduce the risk of a PIE that occurs frequently, 
diverse means are used to detect the departure from normal operation (like 
temperature and pressure). These are normally implemented in diverse trains of 
equipment using different types of sensors and with different means of achieving a 
safe state for the same PIE. 
To improve its reliability, a protection train typically also has a high level of internal 
redundancy to tolerate hardware failure in the sensors, protection logic, actuators and 
plant components (like valves or pumps). Even so, if sufficient hardware sub-
components fail, the train will be unable to respond to the demand triggered by the 
PIE. Depending on the PIE involved, different sets of hardware components of the 
protection train need to be able to respond successfully to demands initiated by 
different PIEs. Typically the hardware probability of failure on demand for a PIE is 
determined by fault tree analysis [2], where the minimal cutsets of failed sub-
components are identified [3] that result in a demand failure. By quantifying and 
summing the minimal cutsets, the probability of failure per demand for a given PIE 
can be computed. 
Probabilistic analysis of hardware-based systems is well established, but less work 
has been done on including the impact of software failures in a computerized 
protection system. In this paper, we present a method that allows a conservative 
estimate to be made for the probability of failure on demand (pfd) for diverse 1 out-
of-2 protection trains where one train is software based, given the form of claims 
commonly offered for software reliability.  
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2 Terminology and modeling approach 
 
As discussed above, a protection system responds to demands – events that require its 
intervention. Whether the protection system will respond correctly or will fail on the 
demand depends on the characteristics of the demand. The protection system may fail 
– that is, fail to start the required safety action – if, for instance, some hardware 
component (or redundant combination of components) that is needed to respond 
correctly is permanently faulty, or suffers a transient fault, at the time of that demand; 
or due to a design defect in hardware logic or in software. We therefore can also 
identify a specific demand as  a vector of values that together determine the likelihood 
of any of the protection trains failing: 
• since the protection system monitors the values of state variables of the plant 
(e.g. pressures, temperatures, measures of flows) and may fail or not 
depending on their values (especially software bugs may depend on the exact 
values of the data), this vector includes the sequences of values that are read 
during the demand event;1 
• since hardware probabilities of failure are affected by environmental variables  
(e.g. temperature, humidity, atmospheric pressure, level of electromagnetic 
radiation, in the various part of the system), these variables are also parts of 
the vector. Probabilities of hardware failure are usually available for ranges of 
variables. 
The demand is thus a (vector) random variable; processes in the protected plant and 
its environment determine the times of occurrence of each demand as an event and the 
value of the demand vector. In what follows we will use just the term “demand” when 
the meaning “event” or “vector” is clear from the context. 
The demand vector includes all variables that have an effect on the success or failure 
of any part of the system. Thus, for instance, temperature values at a certain sensor in 
the plant are part of the demand even if only one of the protection trains reads them. 
But some components of the demand affect more than one protection train. Thus, for 
instance, an earthquake that affects two protection trains will increase the probability 
of failure of both, possibly (if the shock is way above their design limits) to 1. Thus 
we can model common causes of failure via demands which imply high probability of 
failure for both trains. 
This form of modeling has been used in earlier work [4-6] to model in a consistent 
way failures due both to physical causes and to design, and thus both hardware and 
software failures. The basic idea here is one of variation of the probability of system 
failure between different demands, as an explanation for dependence in failure 
behavior between diverse trains to be used in a fault tolerant system (e.g. a 1-out-of-2 
                                                 
1
 With software, one could imagine the protection sytem as realising a deterministic function of the 
values it reads: the probability of demand could only be 0 or 1. In practice, whether it fails may depend 
on the software’s past history. So a specific demand implies a probability of system/train  failure, 
which is not necessarily 0 or 1, rather than deterministic failure or success. 
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system). The idea is a simple one. The probability of a system failing on a demand 
will, in general, vary across demands. Since the component values of the demand 
vector together determine the likelihood of a protection train failing, and if the 
system’s design is such that we can exclude failures of one train directly causing 
failures of the other, the failures of both trains on a specific demand (a specific value 
of the demand vector) can be assumed independent conditionally on the demand 
Interest then centers upon the covariance (across all demands) between the two 
functions (of the demand) that describe the probabilities of failure of the two trains of 
a 1-out-of-2 system. When there is positive covariance – roughly, when the demands 
that associated with a higher probability of failure for one train also tend to to 
assocviate with a higher probability of failure for the other – then it is more likely that 
there will be positive correlation between the trains’ failures on a random demand. In 
such a case, wrongly assuming independence of failures between the two trains will 
give an optimistic estimate of the reliability of the 1-out-of-2 system2. 
An achievement of these conceptual models is their establishment of, and explanation 
for, the inevitability of dependence (positive or negative) of failure behavior between 
redundant, diverse systems, hardware or software. They thus support the empirical 
evidence for such dependence that comes, for example, from experiments: see e.g. [7, 
8]. No longer is it possible to claim that the two diverse protection trains of a 1-out-
of-2 fault tolerant architecture will fail independently of one another, without making 
very strong claims: essentially that there is no variation of failure probability across 
demands for at least one of the trains. This means that the simple arithmetic of 
independence is not applicable for the computation of the system reliability as a 
function of the component reliabilities. Specifically, the pfd of a 1-out-of-2 system 
over all demands cannot simply be assumed to be the product of the pfds of the two 
trains. Informally, it means that we need to know how dependent the failures of the 
trains will be. 
Reliability estimation of such a 1-out-of-2 system is non-trivial as it seems to require 
a complete knowledge of how the probability of failure varies between demands.  
However, we can reason by failure classes, defining a “class” as a set of demands 
such that the estimated pfd is the same for all demands in a class. For simple 
hardware, a “class” means a set of demands such that correct response to any of them 
requires the same set of subsystems to function correctly. If the demand classes for 
two protection trains do not exactly coincide, a demand class is defined as a set of 
demands such that each one of the trains has constant pfd over all the demands in the 
set. This will generally involve more demand classes for the system than would be 
defined for each train alone. If this definition led to too many classes of demands, 
their number can be contained, and kept tractable, by merging classes and using the 
highest pfd among those classes thus merged. It can easily be shown that given 
conditional independence on each demand, and constant pfd across the class for at 
least one of the two trains, failures of the two trains are conditionally independent 
                                                 
2
 It is possible to do better than independence if there is negative association between the probabilities 
of failure over the demands.  
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conditionally on the demand class [9]. Thus, the system pfd conditional on a certain 
demand class is obtained by multiplying the pfd values, for that demand class, of the 
two trains. 
For software, things seem much more problematic: software faults are such that 
among two demands that are from all other viewpoints in the same “class”, the 
software may fail on one but not the other depending on the values of the inputs to the 
software. In fact, claims about software reliability are often limited to the marginal 
probability of failure on demand based on arguments of quality of production and 
verification, “proven in use” arguments, or operational testing that is sufficient for 
assessing marginal pfd but insufficient for assessing conditional pfd for each demand 
class. 
Since independence of failures is not plausible, system pfd depends on how the 
software pfd varies across demands, or demand classes: a claim of even very low 
marginal software pfd may not be sufficient to support a claim for satisfactory system 
pfd.  In this paper we derive a worst-case bound on the system pfd given this kind of 
scenario. We present a solution for deriving a conservative estimate for the system 
pfd for a 1-out-of-2 protection system architecture where there is software in one train 
only. The pessimistic (but attainable) bound for the probability of failure on demand 
for such a system requires only the marginal pfd of the software (together with the 
varying hardware pfds across different demand classes). The basic ideas here can be 
generalized to more complex systems than the example we use in the paper.  
 
3 Protection System Reliability Model 
 
The example 1-out-of-2 system we shall use for illustrating our reliability modeling 
approach is a nuclear reactor protection system with two trains: the X-train and the Y-
train. Real-life examples of such systems include the UK Sizewell B reactor’s 
primary and secondary protection systems, and the safety systems of advanced gas-
cooled reactors (AGRs). 
Consider first the simple situation in which each train is built of hardware alone, as in 
Fig 1. We shall classify the demands, as outlined above, into different classes. A 
demand of one class will typically have a different probability of failure from a 
demand of another class. In the case study that prompted this work, a demand class 
could be characterized by the equipment that was needed to function correctly for the 
demand to be successfully met (as discussed in Section 1). Some demand classes, for 
example, required more equipment than others, and thus the chance of failure would 
be greater because there would be more devices able to fail. Within a demand class, 
demands will differ from one another in some respects: for example, the reactor state 
will be different, represented by the readings of sensors for temperature, pressure, etc. 
Nevertheless, all demands within a demand class are assumed to have the same pfd, 
as required by the definition of “demand class”. This assumption is reasonable as the 
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hardware pfd is primarily determined by the minimum equipment requirement for the 
specific demand class rather than the state of the reactor. 
X-train h/w
Y-train h/w
 
Figure 1. Independent trains (hardware based) 
Conditional on each demand class there is conditional independence between failures 
of the X and Y trains. This assumption is justified on the basis of there being effective 
isolation between the trains, to avoid failure propagation between them, and there 
being no variation of pfd for the hardware of a train between demands within a 
demand class. Common stresses (e.g. like elevated temperatures) or shocks are 
modeled as creating specific demand classes where hardware pfds are increased, but 
still failures are independent conditional on this higher pfd (possibly very close to 1, 
for shocks affecting hardware in both trains) [5]. 
With these assumptions, we can see that the (marginal) probability of failure on 
demand of the 1-out-of-2 system, i.e. for a randomly chosen demand, is the 
probability of both X-train hardware and Y-train hardware failure:  
)()()( ifipippfd
hhhh Y
i
XYX =         (1) 
where )(ip
hX
 is the probability of X-train hardware failure on demand class i, )(ip
hY
 
is the probability of Y-train hardware failure on demand class i, and f (i)  is the 
probability that a randomly chosen demand is of class i.  
Clearly, the pfd is different from the result that would be obtained under an incorrect 
assumption of unconditional independence of failure between the two trains, which is 












= 
i
Y
i
XYX ifipifippfdpfd hhhh )()()()(.  
The true result will exceed the incorrect result (based on the false assumption of 
independence) so long as there is positive covariance between the X- and Y-train 
demand class pfds, )(ip
hX
 and )(ip
hY
. This is similar to the result that Eckhardt and 
Lee [6] obtained for software diversity. The positive covariance means that there is a 
tendency for large demand class pfds in the X-train to be associated with large 
demand class pfds in the Y-train. Informally, if we see the X-train fail, we might 
expect that the demand class was likely to be one with a large pfd, and thus might be a 
high-stress demand class such that the Y-train pfd is also probably large, and therefore 
its probability of failure is greater than it would be unconditionally.  
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We now consider the situation that is the subject of this paper, in which one train 
contains software, and the train fails if the software fails: see Fig 2. 
We still classify the demands into classes with constant hardware pfd as before. 
There is still conditional independence, conditional on the demand class, between 
failures of the X-train (hardware and software), on the one hand, and the Y-train 
(hardware only) on the other, for each demand class i. This is because (i) the trains 
fail independently conditional on each demand; and (ii) within each demand class, the 
pfd of train Y is the same for every demand. Thus the probability of failure on 
demand is now: 
( ) )()()()()( ifipipipippfd
hshshhsh Y
i
XXXYX  ++ −+= .     (2) 
where )(ip
sX
 is the probability of failure of the X-train software on a demand of 
class i and )(ip
shX +
 is the probability of simultaneous hardware and software failure 
on a demand of class i. 
 
X-train h/w
Y-train h/w
X-train s/w
 
Figure 2. Hardware train plus computerized train 
 
To use expression (2) we need to know, or more plausibly, be able to estimate, the 
parameters on the right hand side. 
In many cases it is likely that estimates  of { })(ip
hX
, { })(ip
hY
 could be based on 
knowledge of the different subsets of hardware required for each demand class. The 
parameters { })(ip
shX +
 are not likely to be known, nor to be estimatable, but it is clearly 
conservative to set them to 0. 
The major practical difficulty is that the { })(ip
sX
 will generally be unknown and not 
estimatable. However, an estimate of 
sX
pfd , the marginal pfd of the X-train software, 
will often be available, based on the usual qualitative criteria used for claims about 
software, or possibly on operating experience in other similar contexts. 
The question we ask in the next section, then, is: what is the worst system pfd that 
could arise with these constraints on our knowledge about the model parameters? We 
answer this question in two stages.  
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4 Worst case system pfd   
 
Firstly, it is easy to see that, for given values of the known parameters, the largest 
value of the system pfd, (2), occurs when 0)( =
+
ip
shX
 for all i. This conservative 
bound on the system pfd is then  
)()()( ifipippfdpfd
hshhhsh Y
i
XYXYX +=+       (3) 
Secondly, we need to know what is the worst allocation of the marginal pfd of the X-
train software to the second term on the right hand side of (3), i.e. the one that makes 
(3) the largest value that this conservative bound on the system pfd can take. That is, 
we need to find which set of numbers { })(ip
sX
, satisfying the constraint 
=
i
XX ifippfd ss )()( , maximizes 
i
YX ifipip hs )()()( .  
Now 
( ) ( ) ( ))()()(),()()()( ipEipEipipCovifipip
hshshs YXYX
i
YX +=  
where ( ))(ipE
sX
 is the marginal pfd of the software, i.e. =
i
XX ifippfd ss )()( , and 
( ))(ipE
hY
 is the marginal pfd of the Y-train hardware, i.e. )()( ifippfd
i
YY hh = . If we 
keep these two probabilities constant, the maximum value of 
i
YX ifipip hs )()()(  
occurs when ( ))(),( ipipCov
hs YX
 takes its maximum value. Clearly this occurs when 
we associate large values of )(ip
sX
 with large values of )(ip
hY
. 
We call the allocation process “bin-filling”. Informally, we proceed by first allocating 
as much of 
sX
pfd  as we can to the demand “bin” that has maximum Y-train hardware 
pfd; we allocate as much of the remaining 
sX
pfd  to the demand bin with the next 
largest Y-train hardware pdf, and so on until we have ‘used up’ all of 
sX
pfd . In each 
allocation of part of 
sX
pfd  to a demand class, we recall that in this conservative case 
we have assumed that hardware and software failures are disjoint for all demand 
classes: thus only enough of 
sX
pfd  is allocated to a demand class to make failure of 
this class certain (i.e. from either a hardware or a software failure). 
Rather more precisely, the procedure to find the maximum value that our conservative 
bound on the system pfd can take is as follows: 
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Without loss of generality, we can order the demand bins, i, by their Y-train pfd, such 
that )1()( +≥ ipip
hh YY
 
We define a term S(i) as the software pfd  that is available for allocation to bin i. So 
we start with: 
sX
pfdS =)1(  
Then, starting at i=1, we assign: 






−= )(
)(),(1min)(
if
iSipip
hs XX
 
The software pfd remaining for the next bin is: 
)()()()1( ipifiSiS
sX
−=+          
This process continues up to bin j, say, where the software pfd has been used up, i.e. 
where S(j+1)=0  
The final bin j may, of course, not be completely filled (i.e. the probability of failure 
associated with the bin – from hardware and software – may be less than 1). 
As S(j+1)=0, all remaining bins will be assigned a software failure probability of 
zero. 
The numbers { })(ip
sX
 that result from this procedure give the worst case value for the 
conservative system pfd bound (3). A precise statement of this result, and its proof, 
can be found in the Appendix.  
One way of using this result is to compare it with a naïve estimate that ignores 
variations in software pfd across demand classes, i.e. where we assume that the 
marginal software pfd is applied to all demand classes The difference can be 
expressed as a ratio of the pfd obtained using the worst-case { })(ip
sX
 values, and 
using 
ss XX
pfdip ≡)( . 
 
5 Examples 
 
Informally, the theorem states that the worst case error (i.e. the maximum 
underestimate of the system pfd) will occur when all the X-train software pfd is 
associated “parsimoniously” with those demand classes that have the largest Y-train 
hardware pfds. Consider the (artificial) example in Table 1. 
Here the X-train marginal software pfd is assumed to be 0.001. With the Y-train 
hardware failure probabilities and the demand class probabilities shown in the table, 
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the question is how to allocate the X-train software failure probabilities to maximize 
the underestimate of system pfd, subject only to constraining the X-train marginal 
software pfd to be 0.001. 
In the table, the Y-train hardware pfds have been ranked in descending order of 
magnitude. We assign just sufficient X-train software pfd to each of the largest of the 
Y-train hardware pfds to make X-train failure (from either hardware or software) 
certain for these demand classes.  We can do this for demand classes 1, 2, 3; but there 
is not sufficient X-train software pfd remaining to do it for demand class 4. In fact, 
demand class 4 has a software pfd of 0.0001 in order to satisfy the constraint that the 
marginal X-train software pfd over all demand classes is 0.001. That is: 
001.0)4()4()()(
3
1
=⋅+=
=i
XXX fpipifP sss  
The overall probability of X-train failure – from hardware or software – for demand 
class 4 is then 0.0031. For the remaining demand classes, 5 and 6, software failure is 
impossible under this assignment – all the X train software pfd has been “used up” on 
the earlier demand classes – although hardware failure is possible: see last two entries 
in final column of Table 1.  
 
i f(i) )(ip
hY
 )(ip
hX
 Worst case 
allocation of X-
train software 
pfd, 
)(ip
sX
 
Resulting total probability 
of failure (hardware and 
software) of X-train, 
)(ip X  
1 0.00001 0.009 0.006 0.994 1 
2 0.00009 0.008 0.005 0.995 1 
3 0.0009 0.007 0.0004 0.9996 1 
4 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.0001 0.0031 
5 0.09 0.0005 0.0002 0 0.0002 
6 0.9 0.0004 0.0001 0 0.0001 
Table 1. Bin filling example 
 
It can be seen that the binning procedure allocates zero software pfd to demand 
classes 5 and 6. This does not mean we postulate the software will actually be perfect 
for that demand class - it is merely a result of fact that the conservative allocation 
process is designed to maximize the system pfd over all demands. 
This result generalizes. There will be 1s in all the early entries of the 6th column of 
Table 1, corresponding to the largest Y-train hardware pfds. There will be 0s in all the 
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late entries of the 5th column of the Table, corresponding to the smallest Y-train 
hardware pfds. There will be at most one row that does not have a 0 in the 5th column, 
or a 1 in the 6th column: the values of these two entries will be determined by the need 
to satisfy the constraint. 
The pfd of the 1-out-of-2 system, using the worst-case allocation of the X-train as in 
the fifth column of Table 1, is  
( ) 61032.7)()()()( −×=+ ifipipip hsh Y
i
XX . 
In contrast, the system pfd based on assuming (wrongly) that the marginal X-train 
software pfd, 001.0=
sX
p , applies to all demand classes, is  
( ) 71080.6)()(001.0)( −×=+ ifipip hh Y
i
X . 
Therefore the naïve estimate of system pfd ignoring variation in software pfd between 
demand classes and the worst case estimate of the system pfd differ by a factor of 
10.76. 
This simple procedure outlined above for obtaining the worst case bound is easy to 
prove in a case like that in Table 1, where the Y-train hardware pfds are strictly 
ordered. If, on the other hand, some of the Y-train hardware pfds are identical, there is 
a complication: in such cases there may be more than one maximum. This can be seen 
in the example of Table 2 below. 
 
i f(i) )(ip
hY
 )(ip
hX
 
Worst case 
allocation of 
)(ip
sX
, first 
case 
Worst case 
allocation of 
)(ip
sX
, second 
case
 
)(ipX  in 
first case 
)(ipX  in 
second case 
1 0.001 0.009 0.006 0.994 0 1 0.006 
2 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.0006667 0.1111111 0.0056667 0.1161111 
3 0.09 0.005 0.003 0 0 0.003 0.003 
4 0.9 0.005 0.004 0 0 0.004 0.004 
Table 2. Example with a non-unique bin-filling sequence 
 
It is easy to see in this case that there are two ways in which the X-train software pfds 
can be allocated, whilst still satisfying the constraint on the marginal pfd. However, it 
is also easy to show that in each case, the worst case 1-out-of-2 system pfd (using (3) 
with the entries from, respectively, the fifth and sixth columns of Table 2) is 
2.88×10-5; and the system pfd calculated assuming all demand classes have pfd 0.001 
(the marginal X-train software pfd) is 2.48×10-5. In other words, the worst case 
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underestimate of system pfd arising from ignoring variation in X-train software pfd is 
the same – 0.40×10-5 – in each case. 
It can be shown that this will always be true: when there are several ways of worst 
case allocation of the X-train software pfds, each will give the same maximum 
underestimate of system pfd.  
 
6 Discussion 
 
The work by Eckhardt and Lee (and later work) introduced a new way of looking at 
the reasons for dependence between the failure behavior of diverse versions of 
software. In these models, everything turns on the variation of the failure probability 
as a function of the specific demand. This earlier work gave novel insights into the 
reasons why claims for independence are rarely supportable. Unfortunately, it also 
introduced some serious difficulties for anyone wishing to exploit the models to 
estimate the actual probabilities of failure of real systems, since this requires 
estimation of how failure probability varies across all demands. 
In this paper we have looked at a particular system: a 1-out-of-2 system in which only 
one train contains software. In the example that motivated this work – a protection 
system for a nuclear reactor – we were able to identify a small number of demand 
classes (<20) for each of which a hardware pfd could be estimated. In fact these had 
been estimated as part of the wider safety case for the reactor.  For software, on the 
other hand, only a marginal pfd was estimated. Our aim, therefore, was to obtain a 
means of computing the worst system pfd that could result for a given software 
marginal pfd. Such a result could be used conservatively as part of a safety case 
claim. 
Our main result, then, is a procedure for finding such a worst case result, based upon 
a conservative bound on the system pfd which assumes that simultaneous hardware 
and software failure in a train is impossible.  
As we have found elsewhere whilst working on these models of diversity, these 
results are quite surprising and subtle: witness, for example, the pivotal role played by 
variation in Y-train hardware pfd when we take into account X-train software 
failures. We do not think that these results could have been obtained without the 
formal model of diversity, although we believe that they are intuitively convincing in 
retrospect. 
Our result here represents a tighter (i.e. less conservative) bound than can be obtained 
with more simplistic assumptions. This lessening of conservatism depends on (i) the 
assumption of failure independence between trains, conditional on each demand class, 
and (ii) some knowledge about the demand classes, specifically their probabilities and 
the hardware pfds conditional on each class for each train. Without these premises, 
the worst case system pfd could only be stated as the smaller of X-train pfd and Y- 
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train pfd, which is at worst min PYh, PXh +PXs( ). Our tighter result will often be much 
lower than this worst case – informally this is because pYh (i)<<1 for all i – although 
we can contrive scenarios, with typically implausible values of the parameters, in 
which it approaches or even equals it. 
On the other hand, estimates of software pfd per demand class would allow even 
tighter estimates of system pfd, which could be orders of magnitude lower if all these 
)(ip
sX
 are orders of magnitude lower than 1. One way of reading our result is that it 
is far better to bring to the calculation of system pfd some estimate of software pfd per 
demand class, as argued for instance in [10] and exemplified in [9], rather than over 
the whole demand space. But when the latter is the only estimate available for 
software pfd, we offer a way of using other knowledge that is available per demand 
class to avoid extreme overestimation of system pfd. 
These results depend on the ability to state estimates of constant pfd per demand class 
on the Y channel, that is, to trust that the Y channel is free from demand-specific 
variation of pfd within a demand class. If this could not be assumed (for instance if Y 
implemented complex logic - albeit hard-wired - that were not trusted free of design 
faults affecting specific demands in one class), a more conservative method suitable 
for two software-based trains (e.g. as [9]) should be used. 
Note that, if a conservative value of the X-train software pfd over all demand classes 
were available (i.e. a value that is not exceeded by its true pfd on any demand class), 
then the system pfd calculated using this value for all the )(ip
shX +
 terms in expression 
(2)  would be conservative. In fact, it may be very conservative: our result points to a 
way of lessening this conservatism. 
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Appendix: Worst case value for the conservative system pfd bound 
We need to find the set of numbers { })(ip
sX
, satisfying the constraints: 
niip
ifippfd
s
ss
X
n
i
XX
..1,1)(0
;)()(
1
=≤≤
=
=        (A1) 
that maximizes  
( ) )()()()()(
1
ifipipipippfd
hshshhsh Y
n
i
XXXYX 
=
++
−+= ,     (A2)   
where n is the number of demand bins;  )(ip
sX
 is the probability of failure of the X-
train software on a demand of class i, and )(ip
shX +
 is the probability of simultaneous 
hardware and software failure on a demand of class i. 
We assume that the X-train software and hardware are reliable enough to satisfy 
,1≤+
hS XX
pfdpfd  
i.e. the failures of the X-train software and hardware can be mutually exclusive. 
The conservative bound for (A2) is 
 
( )
)()())(1),(min(
)()())(1),(min()(
1
1
ifipipippfd
ifipipipippfd
hhshh
hhshhsh
Y
n
i
XXYX
Y
n
i
XXXYX


=
=
−+
=−+=
+
 
Thus, we need to find the set of numbers { })(ip
sX
, satisfying the constraints (A1), that 
maximizes  
 
=
−=
n
i
YXX ifipipipE hhs
1
)()())(1),(min( .     (A3)  
Theorem 
If the set of numbers { })(ip
sX
 satisfies the constraints (A1) and: 
-  without any loss of generality, the  bins are ordered in the following way: 
)(...)2()1( nppp
hhh YYY
≥≥≥ ; 
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pfdpfd , i.e. 
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- integer number k satisfies: 1  k   n and   

=
−
=
−≤≤−
k
i
XX
k
i
X hsh
pifpfdpif
1
1
1
)1)(()1)(( ,  
then  






−−+−
=≤

−
=
−
=
1
1
1
1
))(1)(()()())(1)((
'
k
i
XXY
k
i
YX ipifpfdkpipipif
EE
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Proof 
Our proof of the theorem is based upon two lemmas: 
Lemma 1 
If (A1) and (A4) are satisfied and { })(ip
sX
 is a set of numbers maximising (A3), then 
,:1),(1)(0 niipip
hs XX
=−≤≤       (A6) 
And 
 
=
=
n
i
YX ifipipE hs
1
).()()(
        (A7) 
 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Reductio ad absurdum: let us assume that Lemma 1 is wrong and that for some bin k:  
)(1)( kpkp
hs XX
−> .         (A8) 
The condition (A4) implies that for some other bin l: 
)(1)( lplp
hs XX
−< .        (A9) 
Conditions (A8) and (A9) together mean existence of two numbers δ1 >0 and δ2 >0 
such that: 
)()(
);(1)(
);(1)(
21
2
1
lfkf
kplp
kpkp
hs
hs
XX
XX
δδ
δ
δ
=
−<+
−>−
       (A10) 
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If we consider the new set of numbers{ }
sX
p * : 
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Then,  (A10) and (A11) implies 
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and 
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(A13) 
Together, (A12) and (A13) contradict the original premise that the set of probabilities { })(ip
sX
 maximises (A3).  
Hence, Lemma 1 is correct. 
QED 
Lemma 2 
If:  
- (A1) and (A4) are satisfied; 
- the set of numbers { })(ip
sX
 maximizes (A7); 
- we denote 
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then the set of numbers { })(' ip
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(A16) 
If, in addition, without any loss of generality, the  bins are ordered in the following 
way: 
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Proof of Lemma 2 
The proof of Lemma 2 essentially involves the solution of the following linear 
programming problem: 
Maximise  E = 
=
n
i
YX ifipip hs
1
)(')()('
 
subject to the constraints 

=
=
n
i
XX ifippfd ss
1
)(')(' ;  niip
sX
..1,0)('1 =≥≥ . 
The proof of Lemma 2 is in three parts. We need to show: 
• that the allocation of X-train software pfd outlined above is necessary; 
• that it is sufficient (i.e. that the different allocations, when these are possible, give 
the same value for the bound); 
• that the maximum of E obtained is the value stated. 
 
Conservative bound for probability of failure in a 1 out of 2 protectionsystem 19 
 
 
 
 
Proof of necessity 
We need to show that, if nip
sX
,...,11 ),(' = , is an optimal solution of the above 
problem, then 
0)('1)(' =∨=< jpipji
ss XX
 
Informally, the statement means that the components of the optimal solution are in 
descending order and only one component may have a value different from 1 or 0. In 
other words, the optimum  solution has the following form: 
  1, ... 1, z, 0, 0, ...,0, 
 where z satisfies 10 ≤≤ z . 
We start by assuming that the opposite statement is true, i. e. niip
sx
..1),(' = ,  is an 
optimal solution of the above problem, but 
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ss XX
. 
Consider the following new solution: 
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The value of E implied by the new solution will be 
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To satisfy the constraints we require 
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because 
)()( jpip
hh YY
≥  
due to the initial assumption and problem formulation. This means that ''EE ≤ , i. e. 
the new solution provides a greater value of the objective function and so the initial 
solution is not optimal. This contradicts the initial assumption, and the proof follows. 
 
Proof of sufficiency 
We need to show that a solution of the following kind is an optimal one: 
 
To prove the statement we shall show that the above solution satisfies the optimum 
criteria for the simplex method [1]. 
In the standard form [1] the problem is 
subject to the equality constraints: 
 
Here: niifippfd
hS YX
..1),('),(, =  are the problem parameters we defined earlier in 
equations (A1) and (A14); z(i), i=1..n are the slack variables [1]. For the considered 
solution the variables )(' ip
sX
 , i=1..k are basic variables [1]. Expressing these basic 
variables through non-basic ones: 
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The objective function in terms of non-basic variables only is then: 
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We can now write the expression for the reduced cost (i.e. for that part of the 
objective function value which depends upon non-basic variables):  
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it follows that all coefficients of the reduced cost are negative. Thus an increase in 
any non-basic variable will decrease the objective function. Hence, the considered 
solution satisfies the optimum criterion for the simplex method [1]. Hence, the 
considered solution is optimal. 
 
Proof of value of worst case bound  
We now need to show that if 
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We know that the maximum of E occurs with the following choice of { }
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Thus, from the constraint on unconditional X-train software pfd: 
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and Lemma 2 follows 
 
The main theorem follows if we apply a substitution inverse to (A14)  to the upper 
bound (A17)  finally obtaining the constrains (A4) and the upper bound (A5). 
QED 
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